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ABSTRACT
A basic problem faced by most economies at early stages of their
developme nt is how best to raise the investible surplus for rapid
accumulat ion: to what extend should the burden be placed on those in the
agricultu ral sector (by lowering the price of their output relative to the
industria l products) , and to what extent should the burden be borne by
industria l workers. This question was central to the early Soviet state
(where it was debated as the problem of price 1ci11or1) and it is central
to many of today's lDCs, whether socialist or not. The answer de.pends in
an important way on· the salient features of the economy: among the
features of the economy which we emphasize here are: the trade environ
ment faced by the economy, the mechanisms which determine wages and
earnings, and the effects of wages and prices on the productiv ity of
workers. Under alternativ e represent ations of these features, we analyze
the consequen ces of changing the terms of trade (on peasants, on
industria l workers, and on the investible surplus) and identify several
intuitive propertie s of the optimal terms of trade.
We examine two other issues which have remained controver sial. The
first issue concerns the effect of changes in the terms of trade on the
intrasecto ral distributi on within agricultur e (for example, on the welfare
of landless workers versus that of landlords ). We delineate simple condi
tions to determine who gains and who loses. The second issue concerns
which agricultu ral inputs and outputs should be taxed, and which should be
We present powerful rules for reform in the prices of cash
crops and productio n inputs. These rules are Pareto improving (that is,
everyone in the society becomes better off); moreover., they are highly
subsidize d,

parsimoni ous with respect to the informatio n required to implement them,
We also use the insights obtained in our analysis to interpret certain
aspects of the Soviet industria lization debate (1924-28) , and the
subsequen t collectiv ization of agricultu re.
l

PRICE SCISSORS AND TIIE STRUCTIJRE OF THE ECONOMY
By Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglit z•

A basic problem faced by the early Soviet state was how best to raise
d.
the revenue s require d if rapid capital accU111Ulation was to be achieve
g
To what extent should the burden be placed on the peasan ts, by lowerin
the price they rec~ive for their output (relativ e to the price of indus
trial goods), and to what extent should the burden be placed on the
industr ial proleta riat?

This questio n of the approp riate terms of trade

in
between the urban and rural sectors (the 'price scissor s') was central
the Soviet industr ializat ion debate (1924-2 8).

In recent years, the same

questio n has been intense ly debated in the People 's Republi c of China,
with a widespr ead view that (to use the econom ists' languag e) the rural
both
sector was too heavily tued during the Cultura l Revolu tion, and that
sectors could be made better off by reducin g the size of the scissor s.
,
In an earlier paper (1984a) , we constru cted a model which, we believe
capture d well the central issues concern ing the price scissor s in a less
develop ed sociali st economy.

We posited a closed dual economy in which

the governm ent has two instrum ents of control :
industr ial wage.

1

the terms of trade and the

Within this model, we identif ied the role of

must
incenti ves, the effect of the terms of trade on how industr ial wages
be set, and the effect of differe nt value judgme nts (concer ning the
welfare of peasant s versus proleta riat) on the approp riate size of price
scissor s.

Also, our model allowed us to interpr et the scissor s policy

advocat ed by some of the key partici pants in the Soviet debate.
1

2

The question of the appropriate price scissors is, of course, central
to most less developed countries, whether socialist or not; simply
because this question represents a fundamental trade off in the process of
development.

The nature of the trade off (that is, the effects of

changing the terms of trade, and the characteristics of the optimal terms
of trade), however, depend critically on the structure of th~ economy; in
particular, on the hypotheses concerning the institutional features of the
econooy.

Among the features of the economy on which we focus in this
~

paper are the international trade environment faced by the country, the
nature of mechanisms which (endogenously) determine wages and earnings
(and the government's role in it), and the consequences of changes in
prices and wages on the productivity of workers.
Whether LDCs should be viewed as open or closed economies has been
long debated.

What is critical, however, is not the level of trade (say

relative to the national income) but the ability of the government to
change the level of trade at the margin.

If the government can not do so

(for instance, because the demand for .the country's exports is very
inelastic in the short run, or because the country faces constraints in
the international credit market which limit its ability to trade) then the
analysis of the price scissors in these economies is quite similar to that
in a closed economy.
that, in

a

In particular, we had argued in our earlier analysis

closed economy, a change in the terms of trade must be

accompanied by a change in the industrial wage.

If the industrial wage

cannot be altered, then the government has no ability to change the terms
of trade.
margin.

Similar conclusions hold if the economy is closed at the
By contrast. if the economy is open at the margin, then the terms

of trade can be set independently of the industrial wage.

This, as we

3

shall see, has important implicatio ns on the consequen ces of alternativ e
terms of trade policies,
Concernin g the determina tion of industria l wage, we consider two
alternativ e contexts.

In a 'socialis t' economy, the governmen t presum

ably has the prerogativ e of setting industria l wage.

In contrast, most

I.DC, have mixed economies in which private firms and unions play a major

role in wage determina tion and, moreover, the level of wage is sensitive
to the prices which the industria l workforce faces.

Therefore , in

•determinin g the effects of changes in the te.rms of trade, one needs to
take into account the indirect effects (on individua ls' welfare as well as
on the investible surplus) of induced changes in industria l wage.
Several hypothese s have been advanced in the literature which contend
2
that the wages received by workers may affect their net productiv ity.
The correspon ding effects of prices on productiv ity have not received the
same attention .

Here we develop a simple way of representi ng both of

these productiv ity effects (for brevity, we refer to both effects as
'wage-pro ductivity' effects).

We incorpora te these effects into our

analysis, and show how specific types of wage-prod uctivity effects (for
example, when food consumpti on affects productiv ity 'more' than the
consumpti on of other goods) influence the analysis of the terms of trade.
The first objective of this paper is thus to determine the incidence
of the terms of trade under these various assumptio ns concerning the
structure of the economy, to analyze the optimal terms of trade, and to
relate them both to the structure of the economy and to society's value
judgments ,

We do this in Sections I to III.

Another objective of this paper is to address two issues of vital
interest to LDCs today,

The first issue concerns the intrasecto ral

4

distributional consequences of the terms of trade:

which groups in the

agricultural sector (landless workers, or landlords, for example) are
helped or hurt by a movement of the terms of trade against, or in favor,
of agriculture.
LDCs.

3

This question has been a source of controversy in many

In Section IV, we delineate conditions which determine who will

gain and who will lose, due to

a

change in the terms· of trade.

Also, we

demonstrate that under plausible circumstances, a movement in the terms of
trade against (in favor of) agriculture hurts (helps) everyone in this
sector, whether rich _or poor.

Further, we show that our basic

characterization of the optimal terms of trade can be modified in a simple
way to include the distributional consequences.
The second issue concerns which of the agricultural inputs and outputs
should be taxed or subsidized.

The answer, as one would espect, depends

in part on the social weights to be associated with the incomes of
different persons (that is, on the value judgments implicit in the social
welfare function), because changes in the prices of different goods have
different distributional consequences.
Agreements on social weights are, however~ difficult to achieve among
policy makers and government officials.

In Section V, therefore, we have

derived Pareto improving rules for reform in the prices of cash crops
(sugar cane and cotton, for example) and agricultural inputs (fertilizer
and tractors, for example).

These reforms make the society better off

without hurting anyone; moreover, the reforms can be conducted on the
basis of extremely limited information.

Our analysis of the structure of

prices within the agricultural sector also leads us to argue that there is
a case against taxing some cash crops and agricultural inputs, while

subsidizing others.

s
The last two sections are devoted to additional interpretations and
In Section VI, we use parts of our analysis to interpret many

extensions.

of the propositions (concerning price scissors) advanced by the Soviet
economist Evgeny Preobrazhensky (1965) in the context of the
We also look at certain aspects of the Soviet

pre-collectivization USSR.

collectivization of agriculture.

In Section VII, we show how our analysis

in this paper can be extended to include several other features of the
economy (such as sharecropping, migration and unemployment) as well as
Concluding remarks are presented at the end

other instruments of policy.
of the paper.

I.

PRICE SCISSORS IN AN OPEN ECONOMY

In this section, we describe the basic model of the economy, analyze
the effects of changes in the terms of trade, and characterize the optimal
The model is that of an open dual economy in which the

terms of trade.

urban wage may either be rigid, or be set optimally by the government.
(In Section II, we drop the assumption that the economy is open; and in
Section III, endogenous determination of urban wages is considered.)
The rural and urban populations are denoted by

The Model:
4

A

and

is the total agricultural land owned equally by homogeneous
The output of the agricultural good per peasant is

peasants.

1
X = X(A/;, L ) ,
works.

1
N

1

1

(x, y)

1
L

and
denote

a

industrial goods,

Q = X -

good per peasant.

p

is the variable number of hours a peasant
peasant's consumption of the agricultural and
x

1

>0

,

is the surplus of the agricultural

represents the terms of trade, that is, the price of

the agricultural good in terms of the industrial good,
constraint is

A peasa~t•s budget

6

pO

( 1)

If

a

= y

1

peasant's indirect utility is denoted by

identity,

1

ov /op= i..

1

where

Q

of income of a person in sector

i..i
i.

V

1

(p)

then, from Roy's

is the (positive) marginal utility
1

'Qp • a1n Q/aln p

is the elas-

ticity of surplus per peasant with respect to its price.

We assume that

this elasticity is positive. 5
An industrial worker's consumption is denoted by

wage rate and (fixed) labor hours are

w and

2
L

6

2

2

and his

(x, y ) ,

A worker's budget

constraint is
2

(2)

If

wL •

V

2

(p, w)

denotes the indirect utility of an urban worker, then

2
2 2
av /ap = -i., X
incom.e and

f;

and

2
= -oln
xp

2
av /ow = i..2L2
X

2

/oln p

and

m =
f;

2
wL

denotes a worker's

2
2
= a1n x /oln m denote,
xm

respectively, the elasticities of his consumption of the agricultural good
with respect to price and income.

These elasticities are positive since

consumption goods are assumed to be normal.
The output of an industrial workers is denoted by
the capital stock per worker, k,

Y •

It depends on

and the labor hours per worker,

In addition, we take account of wage-productivity effects.

2
L •

These effects

have been typically studied in the context of fixed prices, and it has
been hypothesized that productivity is increasing in wage income because,
for exa1:1ple, higher consumption increases workers' efficiency.

A natural

generalization suggests that price changes also affect workers' productiv
ity.

The wage-productivity effects are thus represented through the last

two arguments of the following reduced form expression

7

2
Y = Y(k, L , p, w).

(3)

For later use, we define

a

a

and

m

= -

p

aY _l

ap

X

2 •

to repre-

sent productivity gains from an increase in wage income and from a
reduction in the terms of trade, respectively .
Since the effects of prices on productivity are not predictable, in
general,

7

we consider here two representati ve specificatio ns:

(i) Productivity depends on, and increases with, the level of utility;
2 ,
Y = Y(v (p, w))

that is,

In this case,

a

m

= a

P

(ii) Productivity

depends on, and increases with, the consumption of food (agricultura l
2
Y = Y(x (p, w)) • In this case,

good); that is,
where

£

2u

xp

.

= -clln x

2u

/clln p

am - a p

£

2u
xp

= t

2

2

- a t
x xm

xp

c!x2

£

2u

~

p

denotes the own-price elasticity of the

compensated food consumption of an industrial worker.
properties,

_aY
=

>0

8

Thus,

a

m

< ap

From Slutsky
The latter speci-

fication can be seen as a polar case of the view that productivity is
'more' sensitive to food consumption than to the consumption of other
goods.

Under both representati ons,
and

T

balance implies

T

If

T

X

y

y

a

m

and

a

p

are positive.

denote the net imports of the two goods, then trade
= -PT

X

where

P

is the (fixed) internationa l terms

of trade.

The investible surplus, defined in terms of the industrial

good, is:

I = N Y - ~y

.2

1

1

PT

X

Substitution of (1) and (2) in

the preceeding expression yields

The quantity balance of the agricultural good is represented by

8

■odel.

There are no constraints on external trade in the present

There

fore. (5) can be substituted into (4) to yield

That is, the investible surplus equals the profit from industrial
Note here that.

production. plus th• tariff revenue from external trade.

w can be altered independently of one another.

and

p

in (6).

This

independence. as we shall see later, plays a critical role in determining
the consequences of changes in the terms of trade in an open economy.
Effects of Policy Changes:

industrial workers.

The effects on investment can be ascertained from

8 = T tt-fx
X

2

can be rearranaed to yield

p

The derivative of (6) with respect to

where

is the net import of the agricultural aood as a

fraction of its consumption in the industrial sector.
tive)

8

Also.

1

A negative (posi-

implies that the country exports (imports) the agricultural good.

> 8.

from (5) an~ from

Q

> 0.

•

c

(p - P)/P

the tax or subsidy rate on the agricultural good.
s

on individuals

lowering the terms of trade hurts peasants and helps

are obvious:

(6).

p

The effects of changing

represents

A negative (positive)

implies that the peasants are being taxed (subsidized) whereas the

industrial workers are being subsidized (taxed).
There are three distinct implications of raising the terms of trade.

9

First, raising

p

increases or decreases the tariff revenue depending on

whether, at present, the country is an importer or an esporter of the
aaricultural good.

Second, a hiaher

implies a laraer nral surplus

p

and a aaaller urban demand ud, hence, a lower net iaport of the

agricultural aood.

As a result, the tariff rn·enue increases or decreases

depending on whether, at present, the aaricultural aood ia being tased or
subsidized.

Finally,

a

reduces the in·natible 1urplu1 because

p

higher

These distinct effect, can be

of its deleterious effect on productivity.

•seen separately in the right hand side of (7).
The overall impact of the terms of trade on the investible surplus, of
course, depends on the combination of the above effects.

It appears

unlikely, however, that lowering the terms of trade below

ao■e

level would increase the investible surplus.
would be importing food (that is
and

e > 0)

would be a large negative number.

I

industrial productivity from lowering

p

critical

This is because the country

at a sufficiently low

p,

Thus, if the marainal gain in
is negliaible when

p

is

sufficiently low, then (7) will be positive.
Next, consider the effects of changina the urban waae.
helps industrial workers, and it bas no effect on peasants.

A higher

w

Its effect on

the investible surplus is given by the derivative of (6) with respect to
w.

where

This derivative can be rearranaed as

a

2 ~ px 2 /m
x

tural good.

is an industrial worker's budget share on the agricul

Clearly,

1 >a

(8) is easily interpreted.

2
X

> 0.

Once again, the right hand side of

A higher urban wage reduces

I

dire~tly

10

because the profit from industrial production is reduced.

A higher urban

wage increases the urban consumption of the agricultural good which, in
turn, increases or decreases the tariff revenue depending on whether the
urban workers are (at present) paying a tax or receiving a •ubsidy on this
Finally, a higher urban wage increases the investible surplus due

100d.

to its positive effect on productivity.
The importance of wage-productivi ty effects can be seen as follows.
Suppose

e

2
xm -< 1

effects are insignificant.

and

p

at a given

and that waa,-productivi ty

w,

Then, the expression (8) predicts that a

further lowering of the urban wage increases the investible surplus,
regardless of the current terms of trade.
s
cs

<1
m

a

and

2
X

<1

is negligible.

This is because, by definition,

and, hence, the right hand side of (8) is negative if
This conclusion would, however, be reversed if wage-

productivity effects are significant, particularly at low levels of urban
wage where the productivity loss due to a further wage reduction may be
suff~ci~ntly large to offset other gains in the investible surplus.
Optimal Terms of Trade:

The current value of the discounted aggregate

social welfare is represented by the Hamiltonian
H =

(9)

where

I

ti + oI

is given by (6),

6

denotes the (positive) social value of the
1
1
ti= N wcv ) + frw(v2)

marginal investible surplus, and

Bergson-Samuels on social welfare function.
and

aetaw

2 2 ,

= frL ~

where

~i

c

9

Aiaw,avi

aetap

.-2 2

W-x ((1 - e)~

1

2
- ~] ,

denotes the social weight

on the marginal income of an individual in sector
derivative of (9) with respect to

c

is an additive

p, · keeping

i •

OD

We take the

w fixed, and use (7).

rearrangement of this derivative yields the following characterization of

A

11

the (internal) optimal terms of trade

(~
s

(10)

1

1
2
- ~ ) + 8(6 - ~ ) - 6a

I:

6[(1 - 8)£Qpl + &2 ]

xp

The internal optimum of (9) with respect to

keeping

w,

p

fixed, is

characterized by
2 2
1 - a m ... Sa x & xm

(11)

When

p

and

w

are both being set optimally, then the substitution

of (11) into (10) allows it to be rewritten as
1

- _~_/6)
___
_m_- _a)
_ _+_(a
___
_ _ -_ 0)(1
s = -(1
(12)

(1 _ 0 )£1
Qp

Now recall that

1

> 0,

and

negative if

a's

and

+ &2u
xp

On

are negligible.

a

< ap

m -

From (12), therefore,

the other hand

is poi it ive if

s

s

is

< I>

1

/6 ,

Further, consider the special case in which the

society maximizes the investible surplus, that is
case,

1

s

is negative from (12) and, hence,

a

m

>1

pi/6

->

0.

from (11).

In this
The

following results are i1:1I11ediate; these results are entirely independent
of the volume or the direction of trade.
(i) Peasants are taxed if the social weight on their income is smaller
than that on the investible surplus.
(ii) Peasants are subsidized if the social weight on their income is
larger than that on the investible surplus, and if wage-productivi ty
10
. . .f.
e ff ects are not s1gn1 1cant,
(iii) In an

econo □y

concerned solely with maximizing the investible

12

surplus, peasants are taxed, and the

wage

workers are such that an increase in their

and prices faced by industrial
wage

would increase their

output more than proportionately.
The last result appears counterintuitive at first sight, because one
would expect that the society should be willing to increase the industrial
wage if it can recover, through increased productivity, more than what it
paid.

The reason why this is not true is that an increased industrial

wage also increases the food consumption of industrial workers.

This, in

turn, leads to a loss in the public revenue because the (optimal) domestic
food price is lower than the international food price.

This indirect

revenue effect makes it undesirable for the society to take full advantage
of the productivity gains from increasing the industrial wage.
The expression (12) provides additional insights which are important
but somewhat partial.

For instance, recall that

(cs

Ill

- cs )
p

is zero when

productivity depends on workers' utility, and it is negative when productivity depends on food consumption.

Expression (12) thus suggests that

the optimal terms of trade are lower if productivity is 'more' sensitive
to workers' food consumption than to their consumption of other goods.

11

This is what one would expect, since the marginal social gain from
lowering the food price is higher if workers' productivity is more
sensitive to food consumption.
The expression (12) also suggests that the magnitude of the optimal
tax or subsidy rate is smaller if the peasants' surplus elasticity is
higher.

This is intuitive since a higher

implies that there is a

larger change in the net import of the agricultural good (and hence in the
tariff revenue) due to a given change in the terms of trade.

13

II.

CONSTRAINTS ON TRADE

as quan tity
Many U>Cs face impe rfect trade envir onme nts, auch

borro wing cons train ts
cons train ts imposed by their impo rting partn ers and
oping coun tries
in the inter natio nal cred it mark et. Also, many devel
e of self- suffi cienc y in
consi der it essen tial to main tain a certa in degre
ces can often be
speci fic goods . These and other simil ar circu mstan
formu lated as cons train ts on prici ng polic ies.

If such a cons train t is

conte xt of the above
bindi ng, then its ~rima ry impli catio n withi n the
ed indep enden tly of one
model is that p and w can no longe r be chang
d quan tities
We brief ly exami ne here the case in which the trade

anoth er.

are fixed at the marg in, that is,

T

X

and

T

y

The impli ca-

are fixed .

A chang e in

studi ed.
tion of other types of cons train ts can be simil arly

e in the urban wage, to
terms of trade must now be accom panie d by a chang
t for the agric ultur al
main tain the quan tity balan ce, (5), in the marke
good.

e

If

wp

= dln w/dln p

repre sents this chang e in wage, in an

that
elast icity form, then a pertu rbati on in (5) shows

(13)

Thus:

e

wp

1

2

2

= [(1 - 8)eQp + e xp ]/e xm

> O.

,
In an economy with cons train ts on trade d quan tities

a

decre ase in

in the urban wage.
the term of trade must be accom panie d by a decre ase
leads to a small er
The reaso n is simpl e. Lowe ring the terms of trade
d.
suppl y of rural surpl us and a large r urban food deman

To balan ce the

be reduc ed.
demand and suppl y, there fore, the urban wage must
we would expec t, (13) shows that:

Furth er, as

The reduc tion in the urban wage,

, is large r if the
corre spond ing to a decre ase in the terms of trade
net impor t of the
peasa nts' surpl us elast icity is large r, or if the

14

agricultural good is smaller in relation to its urban consumption.
The industrial workers thus face a lower price, but also a lower wage,
when the terms of trade are lowered.
dv
dp

is

(14)

where

2

• av

2

ap

+ av

2

aw

dw
dp •

The overall effect.on their welfare

This can be expressed as

2
dv /dp-=). 2 x 2 p
p = -1 +

£

,a2

wp•-

X

.

Using (13),

and hence, (14) is positive.

Thus:

p -

cu -

2u
2 2
1
e>aQp + azp 11 a x t xm

) 0

In an economy with constraints on the

traded guantities 1 a decrease in the terms of trade hurts peasants as well
as industrial workers.

The impact of the terms of trade on the investible surplus is quite
easy to analyze in the present case.

Lowering the terms of trade implies

lowering the urban wage which, in turn, increases investment.

The effect

on productivity, however, is ambiguous since a lower food price increases
productivity whereas a lower urban wage decreases productivity.
effect can be obtained from

The total

where (13) gives the

change in wage and, from (4), investment is given by:

I= ~(Y - wL2 ) + (p - P)T

(15)

X

•

This yields

2
dl/dp = -~x [(1 - 8) - (a

m

- a)+ (1 - a )p]
p
m

A sufficient condition for the above to be negative is

clearly, (15) will be negative so long as
to one.

Hence:

am

<1

•

But,

am is not too large compared

In an economy with constraints on traded guantities 1 a

decrease in the terms of trade increases investment, provided wage
productivity effects are not too significant. 12
The Hamiltonian in the present case is

15

H =

e +&I +

11 CN

1

o + TX - N2x2] ,

where

I

is given by (4),

11/0

is the

the indu stria l good, and
shadow price of the agric ultur al good in terms of
13 If
(S).
the last part of H repre sents the cons train t
ed with respe ct
S c: (p
ft/6) /p, that is, the tax or subsi dy is now defin
that the optim al terms of
to the shadow price , then it is easil y verif ied
and (12), and the
trade conti nue to be chara cteriz ed by (10), (11),
case as well.
corre spond ing inter preta tions hold in the prese nt

Fina lly,

the prese nt model is a close d
it shoul d be obvio us that a speci al case of
by subs tituti ng
The corre spond ing resul ts can be obtai ned simpl y
14
ipto the expre ssion s (10) to (1S).

econo my.
8 = 0

III.

ENDOGENOUS INDUSTRIAL WAGE

chang ing the terms of
In this secti on, we exami ne the conse quenc es of
mined endog enous ly,
trade in an economy in which the urban wage is deter
rathe r than being set by the gover nmen t.

In most such situa tions , the

the price s which they
wages indu stria l worke rs recei ve are sensi tive to
has an induc ed effec t
face and, there fore, a chang e in the terms of trade
on the urban wages .

tible
This induc ed effec t, in turn, affec ts the inves

surpl us as well as the welfa re of work ers.

We begin with a gener al formu 

e hypot heses conce rning
latio n which is consi stent with sever al alter nativ
formu lation has the
how the urban wage is deter mine d; moreo ver, this
of the endog eneit y of
advan tage of ident ifyin g the centr al impli catio ns
of this form ulatio n.
the urban wage. We also prese nt some speci al cases
are no cons train ts on
Our analy sis in this secti on assum es that there
exter nal trade .
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as
The urban wage rate is repre sente d in reduc ed form
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w = w(p)

(16)

Denote

t

wp

= dln w/dln p

as the elasticity corresponding to (16) and,

p = -1 +

for brevity, define

£

wp

,a.2
X

Based on (6) and (16), therefore,

the effects of the terms of trade on peasants, industrial workers and the
government can be easily ascertained, following our earlier analysis.
To analyze the normative aspects, note that the Hamiltonian is now

H=

t

2

+ 61 + µ~L [w - w(p)] ,

constraint (16),

where the last term accounts for the

is a Hamiltonian multiplier, and

µ

I

is given by (6).

Expressions corresponding to (10), (11), and (12) can be easily obtained.
For instance, the expression (12) now has an additional term
its numerator.

-µp/6

in

We consider the following special cases of urban wage

determination.
If the urban wage is determined

Fixed Welfare of Urban Worker:

( i)

through a bargaining between the government and a trade union, and if the
union does not suffer from money illusion, that is, the union understands
how the welfare of its members is affected by changes in the wage and
prices, then the urban wage is defined by

(17)
where

V

2

-2
V

bargaining.

(p, W) =

-2
V

is an industrial worker's utility, determined as the outcome of
Expression (17) is a special case of (16).

(17) we obtain

t

wp

= a

2
X

and, hence,

p =

0.

By perturbing

Thus, once again, (12)

holds at the optimum, and the corresponding price and industrial wage are
determined from (12) and {17).

(In contrast, the expressions (11) and

(12) characterize the optimum when the government can set the industrial
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wage.)
Bow high or low the resultin g terms of trade would be depends, of
course, on how much the society cares about peasants .

An instruct ive

special case (which also turns out to be useful in our later
interpre tation of the Soviet debate) is one in which the society does not
care about peasants .

p•.

Denote the correspo nding optimal terms of trade by

·

we can reexpres s (12) as

Then, substitu ting

1

2u

e x.._p____ __
+ _
(1 - e>aQp
____
p• = p ____ ____
(18)

2
(1 - 8)(1 + eQp ) + expu - (am - a)
p
1

Thus,

p•

16

<p

•

represen ts the optimal terms of trade when the welfare of

industri al workers is maintain ed at any given level, and the welfare of
p•

It must therefor e be the case that

peasants does not matter.

maximize s investme nt, subject to a given level of welfare of industri al
This is easily verified by noting that

workers.
p !} p •

• 17

Thus:

dl/dp

~

0

if

For any given level of welfare of industri al workers,

a decrease (increas e) in the terms of trade increase s the investib le
surplus when the existing terms of trade is above (below) a critical
level,

p•, which is below the internat ional relative price.

The above result has an importan t implicat ion even in those cases in
which the governme nt can set the industri al wage at whatever level it
wishes, and when the welfare of peasants matters.

Note that, for any

level of welfare of industri al workers, a price below

p•

reduces the investib le surplus but it also hurts peasants .

Anv price below p•
(ii)

is

not only
Therefor e:

Pareto ineffici ent.

Fixed Urban Wage:

If the urban wage is fixed in terms of the
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industrial good, then the optimal terms of trade is characterized by (10).
If the urban wage is fixed in terms of food then, obviously,

e

wp

e

1 •

Dixit and Stern (1974) considered a further special case of the latter, in
which the hours of work for a peasant are fixed ud equal that for an
industrial worker, the urban wage equals the (fixed) food output of a
peasant, there are no wage-productivity effects, and the society maximizes
investment.

That is,

X

and

y

are fixed,

stitution of these into (6) yields:

wL2 • pX,

1

X

•

2

X

Sub-

I • ~(Y - PX) - (p - P)(N1 + ~)Q.

These assumption$, in effect, reduce a two-sector economy to a single
sector economy consisting of homogeneous individuals.
I

with respect to

(19)

p

The derivative of

yields the corresponding result

s = -1/e 1

~

IV.

DlSTRIBlITION WITHIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Our earlier representation that the agricultural sector consists of
homogeneous peasants is, of course, a simplifying assumption which, though
allowing us to focus on the intersectoral aspects, obscures the intra
sectoral consequences of changes in the terms of trade.

These

consequences have often been a source of controversy, and they depend not
only on the income and land distribution within agriculture, but also on
the induced effects of prices on variables such as the rural wage, migra
tion, reallocation of land entailed by migration, the terms of share
cropping and credit, and the arrangements for sharing work and output
within families.

For brevity, we focus here on the induced effect on the

rural wage but, as we point out later, other induced effects can be
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analyzed similarly.
The importance of the induced effects can be seen as follows.

If

there were no induced effects, then an increase in food price would hurt
the net buyers of food (the landless and the farmers with small land
holdings), and help the net sellers of food (large landlords, for
example).

Quite the reverse may be the case, as we shall see below, if

the wage is highly responsive to the food price.
h

A person belonging to the rural group
script

h •

Correspondingly',

Ah

is denoted by the super-

is the 1 and he owns.

Qh

is his

surplus of agricultural good, which can be positive, negative or zero.

L1h

is his net labor supply hours (that is, labor hours he supplies minus

the labor hours employed on his farm).

Thus

for the net suppliers (demanders) of labor.
and

where

Qh

< 0,

1

w (p)

for the landless.

1
L h

is positive (negative)

Clearly,

h
A

c:

0 ,

An individual's budget constraint is

represents the rural wage per hour which, in general, would

depend on the terms of trade.

Let

e

1

wp

c:

1

dln w /dln p

ticity of the rural wage rate with respect to

p.

denote the elas

Then, using (20), the

Roy's identity yields:

This can be rearranged as

The above expression, in combination with (20), yields the following
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results.
A decrease in the terms of trade hurts (i) every rural individua l,
rich or poor. if the elasticity of the rural wage rate with respect to
price is close to one, (ii) the net sellers (demander s) of labor if the
18
elasticity is significa ntly greater (smaller) than one.
Clearly, how large or small the elasticity of the rural wage rate is
depends on the nature of labor market and on the labor demand and supply

..

responses of individua ls.

Here we consider the case in which there are

constant returris to scale in agricultu ral pioductio n, and the rural wage
rate is determined in a competitiv e rural labor market, that is, from

2

Nlh(Lsh - A~d) = 0

(23)

h

where

rfh

Lsh(p, wl)
Ld(p, wl)

h

is the number of individua ls in the rural group
is the labor supply of an individua l in group
is the labor employed on unit land.

Thus,

h

and

Llh = Lsh - AhLd

is the net labor supply.
Denote

d

d

and

tLw = -iHn L /oln w

d

d

tLp = oln L /aln p

as elastic-

ities of labor demand on unit land with respect to wage and price.

Now,

if the wage rate equals the marginal product; that is, if

d
1
w = paX(L )/aL,

then

d
d
£Lw = £Lp. This is what we would expect since,

in the present case, the labor demand depends only on the ratio of the
sh
sh
wage and output price. Next, define £Lw = a1n L /oln w and
sh
sh
eLp = -oln L /aln p

as elasticiti es of the labor supply, by an

individua l belonging to group

h,

perturbat ion in (23) then yields

with respect to wage and price.

A
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e~ - 1 2J~sh(t~: - e~!)/(2 Nl~sh,~!

(24)

=

h

h

Substitution of the above into (22) makes it possible to express an
individual's gain or loss from a change in the terms of trade solely in
terms of the behavioral parameters which, in principle, can be estimated.
Next, note that the right hand side of (24) is zero if either

L1 h

is

It is easily verified that the latter happens

fixed, or if

if the individuals' labor supply depends on the food price and on the
wage, but not on the price of the industrial good.

In both cases, it is

obvious that the net labor supply of an individual (and hence of the
entire sector) depends only on the ratio of the wage and the output price.
From (22) and (24), therefore:

AIi. increase (decrease) in the terms of

trade helps (hurts) every rural individual if the rural wage rate equals
the marginal product and if one of the following two conditions are met
(i) individuals' labor supplies are fixed, or (ii) the elasticities of an
individual's labor supply with respect to wage and price are close to one
another.
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The normative analysis in the context of heterogeneous agricultural
individuals requires only a slight reinterpretation of our earlier
derivations.

Using (21), define the following 'average' social weight for

the agricultural sector:

~l

c

2Jh~lh(Qh + w L ha!i,/p)/JQ,
1 1

where

h
Q = \L NlhQh/Nl

l individual. 20
.
he average surp l us per agr1cultura
.
1st

It

h

is easy to verify then that, with this reinterpretation , expressions (10),
(11), and (12) continue to represent the optimum.
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V.

PARETO IMPROVING PRICE REFORMS FOR CASH CROPS

AND AGRICULTURAL INPlITS
The simplifying assumption that a single good is produced in each of
the two sectors underlies the long-standina que1tion1 concerning the terms
of trade between agriculture and industry, on which we have focu11ed
Our analysis, however, can be easily generalized to a multitude of

above.

goods by interpreting

Q,

change in the price of the

x,
i-th

and

p

P

as vectors.

The effect of a

good on a rural individual belonging to

is given by Roy's identity

group

h

where

Q~
1

is this individual's surplus of good

is a straightforward generalization of (21).

i •

This, as is obvious,

The effects on the welfare

of industrial workers and on the investible surplus can be assessed
accordingly, and the corresponding optimal prices can be characterized
following our earlier approach,

The implementation of such an optimum,

however, requires knowing, among other things, the distribution of income
within each sector, the social weights corresponding to different groups
of individuals, the own- and cross-elasticities of the consumption
quantities with respect to prices, and the elasticities of the urban and
rural wages with respect to various prices.

Rather than focussing on the

characteri- zation of this optimum, we present here a novel result which
appears much more useful, which shows how Pareto improving price reforms
can be conducted for certain goods on the basis of very limited
information.
Consider those agricultural inputs and outputs which are not consumed,
such as fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, and various cash
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crops.

For brevity, we refer to these goods as 'production goods,'

Clearly, a change in the prices of these goods does not affect urban
individuals, and it affects the consumption and the labor supply of rural
individuals only through their full income and through the induced changes
Further, if the

in the rural wage.

j-th

aood is a production good, and

is the vector of inputs and outputs on unit land, then

z

Qh
j • Ah zj,

where inputs (outputs) are represented as negative (positive) quantities.
We consider here the case in which the rural wage is determined in a
competitive labor market, and assume that all production goods have the
same (but not constant) elasticity with respect to wage.

h./h1

(26)

21

That is

.

• glzj

This assumption, as we shall see, is entirely unnecessary if the induced
wage effects are not significant.
1

dw /dp. -= gz.

(27)

J

J

Using (26), we show in Appendix I that

.

That is, the change in the rural wage due to a change in the price of a
production good is proportional to the quantity of this production good on
This result holds regardless of the nature of individuals'

unit land.

labor supply responses.
Next, define

(28)

cj =

-L sieji
i

where

si = (pi - Pi)/pi

e .. = oln z./oln p.
J

1

J

1

represents the rates of taxes or subsidies,

represents price elasticities of inputs and outputs
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per unit of land,

Thus, (28) represents the proportional change (due to

taxation) in the quantity of the production good

j •

Using (6), (27),

and (28), we show in Appendix I that

g

(The variables

and

B

are defined in Appendix I, but they are

irrelevant for the results to be derived below.)

A special case of the

above is, of course~ when the induced effects of price changes on the
rural wage are insignificant.

In this case

g • 0

obviously, the assumption (26) is not needed.

in (27) and,

E.zpression (29) provides a

basis for the following price reforms.
Consider two production goods,
changed by

Apj

and

j

-(zj/zt)Apj ,

and

If their prices are

t.

respectively, then it follows from

(25) and (27) that the welfare of every rural individual remains un

changed.
(30)

The resulting change in investment is obtained from (29) as
AI

c

(c. - c~)Az.Ap .•
J

..

J

J

The rules for price reforms follow immediately.

Calculate

of the production goods.

and

If

and

j

(inputs), then increase (decrease) the price of the
amount, say
by

t

Ap. , and decrease (increase) the price of the

(zj/zk)Apj •

(input) and the

Parallel rules apply if the
k-th

J-th

J

for all

are both outputs

j-th

J

c.'s

aood by a small
k-th

good

good is an output

good is an input (output).

The above reforms lead to an unambiguous increase in the inveatible
surplus, without affecting the welfare of any individual.
rules of reform are Pareto improving,

Therefore;

A remarkable property of these

The
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ect to info rmat ion. The
rule s is thei r extre me parsi mon y with resp
of refor m cons ists sole ly of the
requ ired info rmat ion to use thes e rule s
ent quan titie s of inpu ts and
curr ent taxe s on inpu ts and outp uts, curr
thes e quan titie s to the chan ges
outp uts on unit land , and the resp onse of

in the pric es of prod uctio n good s.
s of refor m take into acco unt
More over , as shou ld be obvi ous, our rule
the rura l wage s, albe it unde r the
the indu ced effe cts of pric e chan ges on
re of thes e effe cts. If this
assu mpti on (26) whic h rest rict s the natu
the relev ant emp irica l ques tion
assu mpti on appe ars too rest ricti ve, then
indu ced wage effe cts from thos e with
is: how diff eren t are the obse rved
the abov e rest ricti on?

then our
If the diffe renc es are not sign ifica nt,

me parsi mon y in info rmat ion.
rule s of refor m can be empl oyed with extre
nece ssary cond ition for the
Fina lly, it is obvi ous from (30) that a
1
be equa l for all prod uctio n
opti mali ty of pric es is that C,J S shou ld
in the quan titie s of diff eren t
good s. That is, the prop ortio nal redu ction
be equa l.
prod uctio n good s, due to taxa tion , shou ld
ing impl icati on.

This bas an inte rest 

pric es of
Assume, for a moment, that chan ges in the

e effe cts on the quan titie s of
prod uctio n good s have negl igib le cros s pric
,
.• = 0 if i I j ). Then , from (28)
inpu ts and outp uts (tha t is, e Jl
from the stand ard prop ertie s of
sje .. is the same for all j • Next ,
JJ
.. < 0 for an inpu t.
.. > 0 for an outp ut and e JJ
prof it func tion s, e JJ
impl ies a tax
tive (neg ative )
Also , from our defi nitio n of s.J , posi
) on an outp ut. It follo ws then
(sub sidy ) on an inpu t and a subs idy (tax
(inp uts as well as outp uts) shou ld
that eith er all of the prod uctio n good s
d, but not both .
be taxe d or they shou ld all be subs idize
we belie ve that the cros s
This last resu lt is impo rtant not beca use
impo rtant beca use they cast some
pric e effe cts are negl igib le. They are
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doubts on an oft given advice that, on the grounds of equity, some
agricultural inputs (like tractors) should be taxed since they are used
primarily by rich farmers. while other inputs (lite fertilizer) should be
subsidized since they are used by poor as well as rich farmers.

The above

analysis suggests that such policies. when aimed at cash crops and produc
tion inputs. can not be justified on the 1rounds of equity alone; the
primary justification for them should come from the importance of cross
price effects.

...
VI.

THE SOVIET DEBATE AND COLLECTIVIZATION

The Soviet industrializatio n debate (1924-28) is important. despite
its polemics, because it anticipated some of the difficult. but central.
trade-offs which confront many of today's developing economies.

There was

an over-emphasis in this debate on a price squeeze of peasants as a source
of investible surplus, whereas the possible increase in surplus through a
wage squeeze of the proletariat was under-emphasize d.

This bias, however,

may not be surprising, given the pro-proletariat bias of the early Soviet
state.

Also, among the issues which received insufficient attention in

this debate, but which turn out to be central according to our analysis,
are the incentives of peasants and proletariat, and the general
equilibrium effects of the terms of trade.
Our main interest here is to use parts of our analysis to clarify some
of the propositions advanced by Evgeny Preobrazhensty.

Specifically he

proposed that (i) the state can increase capital accumulation by turning
the terms of trade against peasants and (ii) this can be done without
hurting the proletariat.
phrased as:

( i)

dl/ dp

In the context of our model, these cu be re-

<0

,

and (ii)

2

dv /dp

i

O,

while

dI/dp

< 0.
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In our 1984a paper we referred to the above as Preobraz hensky's first and
second proposit ion, respecti vely, and showed that, in a closed economy and
in the absence of wage-pr oductivi ty effects, the first proposi tion is
22 As espressi ons (15) and
valid, while the second proposit ion is not.

(14) demonst rate, respecti vely, the same conclusi ons hold in an economy
with external trade, if the traded quantiti es are constrai ned.

Wage

product ivity effects do not change our conclusi on concerni ng the second
proposit ion.

..

Aho, our conclusi on concerni na the first proposi tion

remains unaltere d provided wage-pr oductivi ty effects are not too
signific ant.

If external trade is unconstr ained then the society has somewhat
greater flexibil ity and, as one would expect, the outcome is somewhat
differen t.

Specific ally, our interpre tation of expressi ons (7) and (18)

suggests that the above proposit ions of Preobraz hensky are valid within
certain ranges of the terms of trade, but not below these ranges.
Though it is peripher al to our analysis , a question which might be of
some interest to historia ns of economic thought is whether an economy with
2.!,

without constrai nts on external trade is a more appropr iate model to

understa nd Preobraz hensky's proposi tions.

Accordin g to Paul Gregory and

Robert Stuart (1981, pp. 73-74), Preobraz hensky believed that even though
the Soviet state would gain to some extent from external trade, their
ability to trade was constrai ned by the lack of credits which their
23
capital ist enemies might not provide.
The Fundame ntal Law of Primitiv e Socialis t Accumul ation:

" ••• the

smaller the inheritan ce received by the socialis t accumul ation fund of the
proletar iat,,,wh en the social revoluti on takes place, by so much the more,
in proporti on, will socialis t accumul ation be obliged to rely on
alienati ng part of the surplus product of pre-soc ialist forms of economy
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and the smaller will be the relative weight of accumulation on its own
production basis, that is, the less will it be nourished by the surplus
product of the workers in socialist industry.''

(Preobrazhensky, p. 124)

Thia 'law' appears to suggest that a lower current capital stock
(a) necessitates the state to put a greater price squeeze on peasants, and
(b) implies that the profit from the industrial sector would be a smaller
fraction of the total inveatible surplus.

For brevity, we shall refer to

the above as Preobrazhensky's third and fourth propositions, respectively.
Within our model, a smaller current capital stock would imply a larger
value of the social weight on investment,

& • With this interpretation,

the third proposition is correct in the sense th•t the optimal terms of
trade would tend to be lower if
example].

6

is higher [see ezpreuion (12), for

What this proposition does not recognize is that, regardless of

the capital stock,

a

price squeeze on peasants beyond some level would be

counter productive, not because the state likes or dislikes peasants, but
because doing so would reduce investment and would hurt the proletariat
(see expression (18)].
The fourth proposition may also be correct under certain circum
stances.

For instance, at fixed wages and prices, a lower capital stock

means that the profit from the industrial sector is lower, and

10

is the

But a

proportion of the total investible surplus coming from that sector.
lower capital stock affects
terms of trade.
and

w

6,

as well as the industrial wage and the

As we have argued earlier, the precise changes in

p

(and, therefore, the changes in the proportions of investible

surplus) are in part determined by the value judgments of the society
concerning the welfare of peasants versus proletariat.
Collectivization:

Our analysis shows that there is a limit to how low

29

the prices to peasants should be pushed, regardless of whether the st~te
values them or not, and there is

a

corresponding limit to how large a

surplus can be extracted from peasants.

If a state wants to extract more

surplus than this, then it must discover some alternative way of organiz
One can interpret the Soviet collectivization as a

ing the rural sector.

response to these problems.

24

According to this interpretation, collec-

tivization was seen as an organizational form which would allow a
significantly larger surplus extraction from the rural sector; this
would not only enable a faster accumulation of capital (deemed by early
Soviet leaders to be urgently needed) but also a betterment of the
proletariat.

As is now well recognized. collectivization did not solve

the incentive problems which are at the heart of what is at issue.
Using economic terminology, collectivization can be viewed as a sub
stitution of a supervisory-command system for a price-incentive system.
Some aspects of the comparison between the two systems (such as the
workers' incentives to shirk under the former) have been extensively
studied.

Here, we would like briefly to raise an aspect which has

received insufficient attention.

Most of the literature has focussed on a

comparison of the ability of alternative organizations to induce workers
to achieve certain work norms.

But a critical problem, particularly in

agriculture (where there are wide variations in the quality of land from
plot to plot, and in the climatic conditions from season to season), is
the setting of norms.
land?
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What 'should' be the output from a plot of

Bow much work is 'reasonable' to expect from someone?

When

individuals work on their own plots, they make these decisions for
themselves.

Also, supervisory systems may work better in a competitive

environment, because workers can choose among a variety of farms, where

30

differences in pay may correspond to differences in work norms.

But there

is virtually no endogenous basis for norm determination in a collective
economy.

26

One method of obtaining some of the infonation which is critical to
the determination of norms for different locations is to have private
plots in the neighborhood of collectives.

Another possible method h

to

set contests among collectives such that high performers receive large
.
·
27
rewards whereas low performers receive significant punishments.
Both
of these methods may, however, be inconsistent with certain interpreta
tions of the socialist ideals.

VII.

Instruments of Policy:

EXTENSIONS

The analysis of pricing policies is critically

influenced by what is the set of instruments which the government can or
can not control.

This in turn depends on the ability of the fiscal

bureaucracy, as well as on the informational and administrative costs
associated with alternative sets of instruments.

The analysis of the

terms of trade on which the present paper -- as well as previous debates
-

have focussed assumes that all individuals (rural as well as urban)

face the same prices.

An important example of an alternative set of

instruments is when the government can administer two different sets of
prices in the two sectors.

To be able to do so, the government 11111st have

the ability to monitor ( at reasonable administrative costs) the movement
of goods across the border between the two sectors.

Its main implication

is that a change in the prices of goods in one sector does not have a
direct effect on individuals in the other sector. 28
Another set of instruments which are employed in U>Cs entail urban
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rations and queues for certain goods, particul arly for food.

The primary

conseque nce of such non-pric e instrume nts is that an individu al's
effectiv e prices become differen t from the market prices he faces.

In our

model, for instance , if food rations are binding on homogeneous urban

individu als, then the effectiv e prices faced by them are differen t from
those faced by peasants , even though the market prices are the same
througho ut the economy.

The analysis of this case, therefor e, is parallel

to the one discusse d above, in which the aoverame nt can adminis ter two
sets of prices in the two sectors.

Similarl y, in a heteroge neous urban

populati on facing uniform rations, those individu als whose consump tion is
constrai ned by rations would face differen t effectiv e prices, dependin g on
29
.
. persona 1 c h aracter1. st1cs.
the1r
A tax which has often been advocate d by economi sts in the context of
lDCs is land tax,
taxation , however.

There are some serious difficul ties with this form of
If the tax is based on land area alone, and not on

land quality, then it is viewed as unfair, particul arly when there are
signific ant variatio ns in the quality composi tion of land holdings of
differen t individu als.

Since land quality itself is not observab le, and

land markets are imperfec t, impleme ntation of a tax based on quality
requires the use of surrogat e variable s which can be observed by an
outside party at a reasonab le cost.

Variable s such as the distance from

irrigati on canals can perform this role to some extent but they may not
have a high correlat ion with quality since land improvem ent is often a

major source of product ivity.

Land improvem ent, on the other hand, is not

only under individu als' control but also is only partly observab le.

Other

variable s such as inputs and outputs are also of limited use because it is
difficu lt to infer land quality from these variable s; moreove r, a tax

32

based on these variables is no longer a 'land' tax.
Features of the Economy:

For brevity, our analysis in this paper has

abstracted from many important features of the economy.

A particularly

important omission concerns the migration of labor between sectors and
30
This, however,
unemployment which might be created by such migration.
can be easily incorporated into our model.

A key consequence of migration

is that various elasticities are adjusted to reflect the fact that the
sectoral populations are sensitive to policy changes.

For example, the

~

rural surplus elasticity would now represent the increase in the surplus
of a farmer due to a price increase, as well as the effect on the surplus
31
due to the price-induced migration between the two sectors.
Another part of the model which we have simplified is the specifica
tion of the agricultural sector.

We have analy&ed an agricultural sector

consisting of heterogeneous individuals who buy and sell labor services,
and in which the rural wage is endogenously determined.

The main point of

this model was to show how an induced effect of price change can be
determined and how this, in turn, can be used to determine the welfare
consequences on different individuals in the rural sector.

It should be

clear, however, that the wage effect is only one of the numerous induced
effects, and that the specific model one should construct to study the
relevant effects should reflect the institutional features of the economy
under consideration.

For example, while family farming may predominate in

some countries, sharecropping or parastatal based agriculture may be more
typical in others,

Furthermore, credit arrangements, and the intra

household arrangements for sharing work and consumption may differ widely
across societies.

For an analysis of the effects of changes in the terms

of trade, the central step in each case is to determine the induced effect
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the terms
of price change (for exampl e on the terms of sharec roppin g, on
of credit , etc. ) • _

VIII.

CONCLUDING IFJIABS

the
A questi on of vital import ance to aoat U>Ca is how beat to raise
fiu1d1 requir ed to financ e a rapid accum lation of capita l.

In adcllti on,

policy are
LDC goverDJDents face a constr aint that very few instna ents of
d
availa ble to them; 90t only their fiscal autho rities have limite
ible
abilit ies, but also sophis ticated in1tr11111ent1 of policy are infeas
becaus e of their inform ationa l and adaini atrativ e coats.

It h not

and
surpri sing, theref ore, that the terms of trade betwee n aaricu lture
invest 
indust ry has been viewed as a primar y instrum ent for raisin g the
ible surplu s in econom ies at early stasea of their develo paent.

The issue

trializ a
of the approp riate terms of trade was centra l in the Soviet indus
analy sis).
tion debate (we interp ret some aspect s of this debate using our

in non
More recent ly, the terms of trade has been a source of contro versy
social ist as well as socia list U>Cs.
within
In this paper, we have presen ted a senera l equilib rium aodel,
(on
which we identi fy the conseq uences of chansi ng the terms of trade
the
those in the rural sector , on those in the urban sector , and on
optima l
invest ible surplu s) as well as the qualit ative prope rties of the
terms of trade.

We show that the conclu sions (posit ive as well as

way on the
normat ive) concer ning the terms of trade depend in an import ant
y which
salien t featur es of the economy; among the featur es of the econom
ment faced
we have emphas ized in this paper are the extern al trade environ
wages
by the countr y, the mechanism for the determ ination of indust rial
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wages on the
and earnin gs, and the effec ts of chang es in prices and
produ ctivit y of worke rs.
We have obtain ed

a

number of resul ts deline ating condi tions under

dized ).
which the agric ultura l secto r would be taxed (or subsi

Also. we

rural secto r
have deline ated ~ondi tions which predi ct who withi n the
or lose from a
(land less worke rs or landlo rds. for examp le) will gain
chang e in the terms of trade .

In additi on. we have propo sed power ful

ction input s:
rules for reform in the price s of cash crops and produ
requir ed to use
these rules are not only parsim oniou s in the inform ation
ble to use them
them, but also they are Paret o impro ving: it is desira
regar dless of what the socia l welfa re functi on might be.
the economy
U>Cs diffe r widel y in what are the salien t featur es of
poten tially
and, there fore, it is not f~asib le to incorp orate every
impor tant featur e in

a

singl e analy sis.

We have. howev er, indica ted how

our model can be extend ed in a number of direc tions .

Also, we have. not

sis such as the
pursu ed here some of the impor tant uses to which an analy
prese nt one can be put.

For instan ce, govern ments often justif y the

n rheto ric.
parti cular polic ies which they pursue . with equal itaria

It is

ion from the
impor tant, then, to examin e wheth er signi fican t redis tribut
instru ments which a
rich to the poor is possi ble throug h the set of policy
32
es to emplo y).
govern ment is const rained to emplo y (or which it choos
param eters
Our model can also be used (with reason able value s of
s under which the
repre sentin g the economy) to ident ify the circum stance
with an
existi ng polic ies in a count ry can possi bly be consi stent

equal itaria n socia l welfa re functi on.

We conje cture that at least in many

which the
cases (parti cular ly in those widel y preva lent cases in
incon sisten cies
govern ment 'appe ars' to subsid ize everyo ne) impor tant
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will be detected.

Whether identifying such inconsistencies is more likely

to affect the policy, or the rhetoric, is a moot question.

APPENDIX I

2 2
1
1 1
Denote the unit profit function as G • G(G (p , w ), G (p ))
2
1 d
is the vector of producti on good•~ prices. Then,
• pz - w L , where p
for the producti on good
1
2
iG
a G iG
1
11
1
2
1
aG 2 •
• aG aG aw

where

j ,
Therefo re, the elastici ty

1

1

i ln zj/i ln w • a1 w

j •

is the same for all

1
w ) • 0 ,

The labor market clearing conditio n is

which,

h

upon differen tiation, gives

dw 1 /dpj •

-<2 ,lhaL1 h/ipj)/ l ,lhaL1h/aw1

•

h

h

Next, the prices of producti on good affect the labor supply only through
1
the full income: Mh c w Lh + AhG, where Lh is the endowment of labor.
Thus

aL1 h/ip. • Ahz.iLsh /aMh - AhaLd/ip .•

d
-iL /ipj • glzj •
I•

-2 ,lhAh(gl

J

J

J

It follows that:

Now, recall that

1
dw /dpj

where

+ iLsh/BM h)/2 NlhaLlh/ awl •
h

h

Using the last expressi on and the symmetry property
izi/ipj • Bzj/Bp i,

the derivati ve of (6) can be expresse d as (29), where

B • -1 + (p - P)~ ,lh[Ah axlh - 1 aqh]/A
iwl
iMh
;

vector for person

h.

Further

g • 0,

effects.

Al

and

x1h

is the consUJDption

if there are no induced wage
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1.

Other instrum ents of policy are discus sed later.

Note, in partic ular,

that the long-s tandin g debate s on price scisso rs (as well as the
can
presen t analys is) are based on the assump tion that the govern ment
not set two differ ent sets of prices in the two sector s.

This assump 

tion may not be approp riate for some U>Cs, like India and South
Korea; later, we discus s the corres pondin g formu lations .
2.

For exampl e, due to the effect of wages on worke rs' efficie ncy,
qualit y and turnov er.

See Stigli tz (1982) , Yellen (1984) , and the

refere nces therei n.
3.

In India, for instan ce, Ashok Mitra (1977) has argued that higher
wherea s
agricu ltural prices have a delete rious effect on distrib ution,

ite is
A. S. Kalhon and D.S. Tyagi (1980) have argued that the oppos
the case.
4.

The supers cripts 1 and 2 denote the agricu ltural and indust rial
sector s.

S.


This formul ation can be easily extend ed to includ e househ old produc
consume
tion goods or so-cal led 'Z-goo ds,' which peasan ts produc e and
but do not trade, presum ably becaus e of high transa ctions costs.

Fl

F2

Though the precise conseque nces of such goods would depend on the
substitu tion possibi lities in producti on and consump tion, it is plaus1

ible that the surplus elastici ty,

IQp •

will be smaller in the

presence of such goods than without them.
6.

The analysis correspo nding to variable labor hours of workers in the
urban sector can be easily worked out.

•7.

For example, if product ivity is increasi ng in the consump tion quanti
ties of various goods, then a change in the price of one good
increase s the consump tion of some goods (gross substitu tes) and
reduces the consump tion of other goods (gross complem ents).

The over

all effect of a price change on product ivity, therefor e, can not be
predicte d without addition al restrict ions.
8.

To avoid trivial details, we assume that there are some substitu tion
2u
possibi lities in consump tion; that is, I xp ) 0 •

9.

W is concave and increasi ng in

V

If the social welfare function

is not anonymous between rural and urban individu als, then
superscr ipted by

W will be

and 2, respecti vely.

i = 1

10. In fact, this result holds even if wage-pr oductivi ty effects are significant , provided

(J

m

=

(J

p

11. The reason why these conclusi ons are partial is this.

Note that

equation s (11) and (12) implicit ly characte rize the optimal
but they do not provide a closed-f orm solution (because
appear on both sides of these equation s).

(p, w) ,

(p, w)

A full compara tive statics
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se the effec ts of
analy sis based on these equat ions is diffi cult becau
cted in
on varia bles such as elast icitie s can not be predi

(p, w)
gener al.
~•s,

ing
Parti al insig hts, howev er, can be obtai ned by treat

a',,

e's.

a

and

e

as fixed param eters in the

eter at a time.
neigh borho od of an optim um, and by chang ing one param
11111st also be
The resul ting insig hts are clear ly usefu l, but they
treat ed with some cauti on.
12. Also, recal ling. the defin ition of
a

m

( 1 •

p ,

it is clear froJ11 (15) that, if

(15) is
then the absol ute value of the right hand side of

large r if

1
£Qp

is large r.

That is, the respo nse of the invea tible

r if peasa nts'
surpl us to a chang e in the terms of trade is large
surpl us elast icity is large r.

This shoul d not be surpr ising since , in

nece ssita tes a
the prese nt case, a reduc tion in the terms of trade
large r decre ase in urban wage.

Para llel concl usion does not alway s

hold, howe ver, when exter nal trade is unco nstra ined.

For insta nce, if

incre ases or de(7) is posit ive, then wheth er its absol ute value
creas es with

depen ds on wheth er peasa nts are being taxed or

subsi dized ,
w price s (for socia l
13. Thus, the optim al terms of trade and the shado
.
cost- bene fit analy sis) are deter mined simu ltane ously
abstr acted from wage
14. Our 1984a paper emph asized this case, and it
prod uctiv ity effec ts.
ng then, with comp letely
15. If the cons train ts on exter nal trade are bindi
ed witho ut intro 
endog enous wage, the terms of trade can not be alter
ducin g addit ional polic y instru ment s.
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16. It is obvious from the expression (18) for

p* •

that

p• < P.

17. To verify this, note from (17) that the change in the urban wage

correspondin g to a change in price is:

dw/dp

c

2 2
x /L

Using this,

The result follows.

and (6). calculate

18. Furthe.r. suppose we define a 'self-suffic ient' farmer to be the one

who neither buys nor sells labor services. that is.

1
L h • 0,

then

it is apparent from (20) and (21) that this farmer is better-off if
the terms of trade are higher.

Categories such as self-suffici ent

farmers and marginal farmers (those who are not landless but are
sufficiently poor) have often been used in policy discussions,
particularly in India.

It should be clear that the boundary lines of

such categories, whether defined on the basis of net trade of labor or
goods, or on the basis of a given level of welfare (real income), are
themselves dependent on the wages and prices.
19. As should be obvious, this result holds even if the wage rate does not

equal marginal product, so long as the labor demand depends only on
1

w /p.

that is, it is homogeneous of degree zero in the wage rate

and the price.
20. The induced wage effects emphasized in this model are typically absent

in the standard iax models [see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), for a
review] which assume that the general equilibrium effects are
insignifican t, or that the government can control wages.

Either

as.sumption is unsatisfacto ry in the context of the agricultura l sector
of an ll>C.

FS

is separ able beh·e en
21. This happe ns if the unit (land ) prof it funct ion
see Appendix I.
the price s of produ ction goods and other price s;

es, see Lau (1978 ).
For detai ls on the under lying produ ction techn ologi
s11J11111arized in his 1979
22. Micha el Ellm an'• impo rtant empi rical studi es,
the contr ibuti ons
book, are sugge stive in this conte xt. He asses ses

n durin g the
of peasa nts and prole taria t to the Sovie t accum ulatio
taria t suffe red a
First Plan perio d, and demo nstrat es that the prole
ver, refer s to the
loss durin g this perio d. (Ellm an'• _ana lysis, howe
ment was coerc ion
post- colle ctivi zatio n perio d when the polic y instru
that, besid es the
rathe r than the terms of trade .) Also note here
instru ment s of
terms of trade , Preob razhe nsy discu ssed many other
, credi t polic y,
_polic y, such as: railro ad tarif fs, print ing money
well as that of his
etc. The cente rpiec e of his verba l analy sis, as
focus sed in this
criti cs, is the terms of trade , on which we have
paper .
models is a bette r
23. A diffe rent quest ion is, which one of the above
e, that is,
repre senta tion of the Sovie t economy befor e the debat
durin g 1918- 24.

e
The trade volume durin g this perio d shows an extrem

Micha el Kaser
decli ne compared to the pre-W orld War I perio d [see
an answe r becau se
(1969 )]. This evide nce, howev er, does not provi de
as we have
any level of trade is cons isten t with both mode ls;
can incre ase its
emph asized , what is relev ant is wheth er the economy
trade at the margi n.
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24. This, of cour se, is

a

pure ly 'econ omic ' inter preta tion.

At the other

ctivi zatio n were
extre me, one can argue that the reaso ns for colle
t of the Sovi et state to
entir ely 'non~ econ omic ,' such as the comi itmen
peas antry , or to simpl y
destr oy the power of pote ntial ly react ionar y
aboli sh priva te prop erty.
indu stria l prod uctio n,
25. The probl em of norm setti ng also arise s in
te piece rates in the
parti cula rly in conn ectio n with setti ng appr opria
prese nce of chang es in teclm oloay .
ity on colle ctive s may
26. This analy sis also sugg ests that prod uctiv
s perfo rman ce of
decli ne over time (rela tive to the conte mpor aneou
colle ctive , histo rical
price -ince ntive syste ms}. In early days of a
norm deter mina tion:
prod uctiv ity may prov ide a reaso nable basis for
less adeq uate basis .
as techn ology chan ges, it prov ides a less and
of indiv idua ls comm itted
More over, in early days , there may be a cadre
ls may not need much
to making the colle ctive s work; these indiv idua
ssity of economic
economic incen tive: as time prog resse s, the nece
incen tives may incre ase.
ar and Rosen (1981 ) for
27. See Nale buff and Stig litz (1983 ), and Laze
analy ses of cont ests.
spon ding anal ysis.
28. See Sah and Stig litz (1984 a) for the corre
29. See Sah (1982 )~
only in lDCs but also in
30. Endogenous migr ation can be sign ifica nt not
by Ellma n (1979 , p. 94).
soci alist econo mies, as has been point ed out
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a, 1984b , 1985) .
31. For a detail ed analy sis, see Sah and Stigl itz (1984

32. See Sah (1983 ).
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